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The reporting and monitoring of swine enteric coronavirus diseases (SECD), including 
porcine epidemic diarrhea virus and porcine delta coronavirus, in the United States 
have been challenging because of the initial absence of a regulatory framework and the 
emerging nature of these diseases. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network, 
the Emergency Management and Response System, and the Swine Health Monitoring 
Project were used to monitor the disease situation between May 2013 and March 
2015. Important differences existed between and among them in terms of nature and 
extent of reporting. Here, we assess the implementation of these systems from different 
perspectives, including a description and comparison of collected data, disease met-
rics, usefulness, simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, representativeness, timeliness, and 
stability. This assessment demonstrates the limitations that the absence of premises 
identification imposes on certain animal health surveillance and response databases, 
and the importance of federally regulated frameworks in collecting accurate information 
in a timely manner. This study also demonstrates the value that the voluntary and pro-
ducer-organized systems may have in monitoring emerging diseases. The results from all 
three data sources help to establish the baseline information on SECD epidemiological 
dynamics after almost 3 years of disease occurrence in the country.
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INtRoDUCtIoN
Since the first detection of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) in the United States (US) in May 
2013, followed by the subsequent detection of porcine delta coronavirus (PDCoV), many efforts 
have been made to monitor the spread of swine enteric coronavirus diseases (SECD) in the country 
(1–7). PEDV and PDCoV reporting to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) are not 
mandatory, although the reporting of SECD infection is encouraged due to their emerging nature 
and important economic impact on swine industry (8).
To investigate the temporal and spatial spread of SECD in the US and to obtain information 
to support decision-making, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) used three data sources, 
namely, the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) (9–11), the Emergency 
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Management and Response System (EMRS) (12), and the Swine 
Health Monitoring Project (SHMP) (13). These sources differed 
on a number of qualitative and quantitative attributes, such as the 
target population, the temporal extent of the collected data, the 
case definition, and the nature of reporting.
The goal of this report is to report the attributes and conduct 
a critical assessment of the three systems used to monitor the 
spread of SECD in the US between May 2013 and March 2015. 
Their evaluation is approached from different perspectives. 
First, we describe features associated with each dataset and their 
respective attributes. Second, the databases are compared in 
terms of shape and size of the epidemic curves generated from 
the data in each. Finally, different qualitative aspects (usefulness, 
simplicity, flexibility, quality of data, acceptability, representative-
ness, and timeliness and stability) are described and compared 
in order to identify strengths and weaknesses and assess their 
potential application to the surveillance for SECD. The report 
here contributes to understand the nature and extent of the data 
collected to monitor PEDV and PDCoV in the US and helps to 
establish the baseline information on the SECD epidemiological 
dynamics after 2 years of disease spread in the country.
MateRIaLs aND MetHoDs
Background of Data sources
National Animal Health Laboratory Network
The NAHLN is a coordinated network of federal and state institu-
tions, which includes universities and animal disease diagnostic 
laboratories that collaborate to provide diagnostic testing to 
animal health surveillance and give response to important dis-
ease events (9–11). The NAHLN laboratories provided weekly 
data files of the PEDV-PCR test result records (14, 15), including 
results from each sample tested and, if available, the associated 
data on the collection site, state, and animal age.
A laboratory accession with one or more PEDV PCR positive 
samples was considered positive. In most of the cases, NAHLN 
data did not include information to identify individual premises 
or herds.
The coverage of the NAHLN data was that of the participating 
laboratory’s service areas. As of May 2014, 24 veterinary diag-
nostic laboratories voluntarily reported PEDV testing data to the 
USDA NAHLN program office (Figure 1).
USDA Emergency Management and Response 
System
The USDA EMRS is an information technology system designed 
to provide timely and effective response to animal health emer-
gencies, including foreign animal disease (FAD) investigations 
and state and national animal disease incidents (12). Federal, 
state, and tribal animal health officials use the EMRS to record 
and view animal disease data, manage incident response services 
and resources, and create reports and maps to facilitate disease 
investigations and associated epidemiological analyses. On June 
5, 2014, according to the Federal Order (FO) issued by the USDA, 
the EMRS was designated as the official system for the recording of 
all SECD situation data collection, information management, and 
reporting. The FO mandated the reporting of SECD cases (16). 
The EMRS also received testing data provided by the NAHLN 
laboratories. The NAHLN data were electronically transmitted 
into the EMRS to facilitate the response activities. The emergency 
response officials investigated all the SECD case reports that 
were initiated by sharing the lab results or other communication 
channels and determined the SECD status of each reported herd/
premise. On the basis of lab test results and consultations with 
herd owners and herd veterinarians, the premises received a 
status of confirmed or presumptive positive for PEDV, PDCoV, 
or both viruses. In accordance with the USDA case definition, 
a confirmed positive herd/premise was a site with animals that 
had at least one positive for PEDV or PDCoV to a PCR test and 
a history of clinical signs consistent with SECD, whereas a pre-
sumptive herd/premise had animals that tested positive for either 
disease without manifesting clinical signs (17, 18). The status of 
the premises was reported into the EMRS as soon as a federal or 
state official had confirmed all the information sources required 
and the status could be updated, modified, or closed until the new 
information became available.
Swine Health Monitoring Project
This system was designed by the University of Minnesota in col-
laboration with the American Association of Swine Veterinarians 
and the National Pork Board and was aimed at monitoring 
important diseases that affected the swine industry. Initially, the 
SHMP included data of porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome (PRRS) cases collected since July 17, 2013. When the 
PEDV epidemic started, the infrastructure of the SHMP was used 
to collect SECD incidence data. The project collects data routinely 
from breeding farms (including commercial/multiplier/nucleus). 
The participation in the project and the contribution to the data-
base on a weekly basis was voluntary (13). The attributes collected 
by this system included the premises ID, the coordinates, the state 
and county of herd, the average inventory/capacity, the type of 
breeding herd, the air filtration status, and the location of nearby 
pig farms (<3 miles). The individual data were informed to the 
participants of the study.
From the data gathered by each source, we described and 
compared the respective epidemic curves.
evaluation of the seDC Monitoring 
systems from Different perspectives
Based on the guidelines proposed by Salman et al. (19, 20), we 
assessed the following aspects of each system:
 1. usefulness (contribution to the prevention and control of 
diseases),
 2. simplicity (considering the operability and logistics),
 3. flexibility (ability to adapt to changing information needs or 
operating conditions),
 4. quality of data (completeness and validity of the data recorded),
 5. acceptability (willingness of people and organization to 
participate),
 6. representativeness (cases detected by the system that represent 
the true situation),
FIGURe 1 | spatial coverage of the three information systems used to collect data on enteric coronavirus records in the United states between May 
2013 and March 2015; top (in green), the National animal Health Laboratory Network (NaHLN); middle (in blue), swine Health Monitoring and bottom 
(in red), emergency Management Reporting system.  
 (Continued)
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taBLe 1 | Comparative features associated with the National animal Health Laboratory Network (NaHL), emergency Management and Response 
system (eMRs), and swine Health Monitoring project (sHMp) databases.
Database National animal Health Laboratory 
Network (NaHLN)
emergency Management and Response 
system (eMRs)
swine Health Monitoring project (sHMp)
Purpose Compilation of PEDV PCR testing data for 
analysis, reporting, and decision support
Occurrence of PEDV in the swine herds/
premises
Situational awareness for the participating systems
Tracking of disease response and control 
actions
Start date June 16, 2013 June 5, 2014 May 13, 2013
Unit record Test result Premise/herd Breeding herd
Coverage National (all sites) National (all sites) Participating systems
Case definition A sample positive to PEDV PCR Confirmed herd: at least one pig positive to 
PEDV PCR plus pigs with clinical signs
Farm in which PEDV was reported by the 
veterinarian, based on clinical signs and diagnostic 
test resultsPresumptive herd: at least one pig positive to 
PEDV PCR and no clinical signs observed
Frequency of data 
submissions
Weekly until September 2014. After, some 
daily submissions using the HL7 electronic 
messaging
Daily Weekly
Participation Voluntary NAHLN labs Mandatory according to the federal ordering Voluntary producers of breeding herds
Access to available 
data
USDA staff and lab participants State and Federal animal health officials Public: as aggregated data
Participants: raw and de-identified data
Reporting Weekly reports of amount of positive and 
negative accessions by week, month, and 
state publicly available
Weekly reports; summaries of the positive 
premises by week, month, and state; reports 
available to the public
Weekly reports depicting time series for 
participating systems
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 7. timeliness (speed between steps in a surveillance system and 
providing feed-back information), and
 8. stability (ability to function without failure and availability 
when the system is needed).
Although the evaluation of sensitivity and positive predic-
tive value were not under the scope of this study, since it would 
require other quantitative approaches, this work also provided 
some evidences from the analysis of outcomes.
ResULts
Comparison of Basic Features and 
Description and Comparison of epidemic 
Curves from Data Gathered by each 
system
There were substantial differences between and among the three 
information systems used to monitor the SECD spread in the US 
(Table  1). Hence, the epidemic curves built from the monthly 
SECD records reported by the three monitoring systems showed 
different shapes (Figure 2).
Shades depict the number of reports on each database and state. Stars in the NAHLN figure indicate the location of the participating laboratories, including 
Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Commission-Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; Athens Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, University of Georgia; University of Illinois 
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; Illinois Department of Agriculture, Galesburg Animal Disease Laboratory; Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; 
Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; Michigan State University–Diagnostic Center for Population and Animal Health; University of Minnesota Veterinary 
Diagnostic Laboratory; Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory, University of Missouri; University of Nebraska Veterinary Diagnostic Center; USDA National 
Veterinary Services Laboratories; Rollins Diagnostic Laboratory, North Carolina Department of Agriculture; Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, North Dakota State 
University; Ohio Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory–Ohio Department of Agriculture; Oregon State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; Indiana Animal 
Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Purdue University; Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic Laboratory, South Dakota State University; and Texas Veterinary 
Medical Diagnostic Laboratory, Texas A&M University.
FIGURe 1 | Continued
These differences could be explained, at least in part, to diverse 
reasons related to the implementation of each system. The SHMP 
was available from the beginning of the epidemic and essential 
to assess the initial stages, since the reporting of SECD from 
NAHLN or EMRS was not in place at that moment. The SHMP 
data were spread over an extended period of time, suggesting 
a lower transmission rate compared to what may be estimated 
using the EMRS data – noteworthy, NAHLN data would not allow 
estimating a transmission rate. In the NAHLN and EMRS, many 
reports were concentrated at the beginning of the curve, likely, 
because they included a number of reports that occurred earlier 
in the epidemic. In contrast, in the winter of 2014–2015, when 
the three databases had been in place for almost 2 years, all the 
epidemic curves pointed toward an increase of PEDV incidence 
versus the previous summer levels, which is particularly evident 
from data in the EMRS database. Although the magnitude of the 
peak differed between databases, the epidemic curves reflected 
an upward trend of PEDV from October 2014 until January 2015.
Because one single state (Iowa) accounts for almost 50% 
of the swine farms in the country, the epidemic curves were 
also explored at state level to assess if the pattern observed in 
FIGURe 2 | Monthly swine enteric coronavirus records reported in the United states by the three monitoring systems between May 2013 and March 
2015.
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Iowa dominated the evidence for the entire country, or if a 
similar pattern was observed at the state level, for those states 
that contribute to most of the swine production in the country. 
Although the disease dynamics seemed to be slightly different 
between states, probably associated with different times of 
disease introduction, demographic, and epidemiological condi-
tions; the most swine-densely populated states showed similar 
trends over time, suggesting that the pattern observed in the 
entire country is not just a reflection of what occurred in Iowa 
(Figure 3).
evaluation of the seCD Monitoring 
systems
Usefulness
The NAHLN database provided information of almost every 
single SECD diagnosis in the US. This information was crucial 
to determine which SECD viruses were circulating. However, 
this system was not sufficient to determine the main meas-
ures of disease frequency or for decision-making, since the 
individual identification of infected premises or herds was not 
recorded.
In contrast to NAHLN, the EMRS database comprised 
complete and reliable data at the farm level for epidemiological 
purposes, including all farm types, and containing data for posi-
tive farms. When the EMRS was in place, the SECD occurrence 
and spread could be investigated and the system was used to 
determine prevention and control measures.
The SHMP served to assess the initial stages of the epidemic, 
when most of the farms were infected. The SHMP data referred 
only to sow farms from some systems and could not be inferred 
to the entire country, but this system helped to create the founda-
tions for an ongoing monitoring system database for emerging 
and non-reportable diseases in the US.
Simplicity
The USDA–NAHLN asked to volunteer labs and universities their 
SEDC testing data and share this information electronically. This 
system followed by NAHLN was much simpler and cheaper than 
the EMRS.
FIGURe 3 | Monthly swine enteric coronavirus records in the four Us states with more positive herds reported between May 2013 and March 2015.
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The EMRS had to collect and verify all the data received at 
the premise level and these tasks required extensive field work 
by USDA staff.
The SHMP asked to volunteer swine producers of breeding 
herds and only operated in some states. Logistics of implementa-
tion were simpler than both NAHLN and EMRS.
Flexibility
The NAHLN demonstrated the capacity to adapt as a result of 
the legal requirements of the FO on June 5, 2014. First, a new 
Laboratory Messaging System (LMS), data management system, 
was launched to store and manage all PEDV testing data. This 
new data system was the USDA’s repository for laboratory test-
ing data and was connected to other key data systems, including 
EMRS. The LMS provided a system to transmit testing data 
electronically to USDA by using HL7 electronic result messaging 
technology. As of March 2015, five NAHLN laboratories were 
electronically messaging their PEDV test results to USDA rather 
than providing weekly data files. Another major change included 
the requirement of the premises identification data with the 
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laboratory records. However, even with this requirement, the 
PEDV laboratory test records often did not include the premises 
identifiers, since the individual lab policies or the premises infor-
mation were not provided by the submitters. The inclusion of 
the national premises identification data with the testing records 
slowly increased from 40% in June 2014 to nearly 90% in October 
2014. In terms of flexibility, logistics for implementation of the 
EMRS was more complex, and consequently, its adaptation to 
new situations required more time and effort than the NAHLN 
or the SHMP.
Quality of Data
The labs that participated in the NAHLN had been previously 
certified for testing samples to confirm SECD diagnosis.
The testing data of NAHLN did not record the premises 
identification and prevented USDA from knowing exactly 
how many farms or premises were infected. The lack of this 
attribute was a major constraint in using the NAHLN database 
for decision-making. The location of herds could be roughly 
determined by the Collection Site State variable reported by 
the lab, but unfortunately, this information was not completely 
reliable. The labs could not validate the location data and the 
state location could correspond to the corporate headquarters, 
the submitting veterinarian, or the billing address. The EMRS 
was specifically designed to enable accurate determination 
of the number and location of infected herds. In the EMRS, 
the PEDV-positive premises were confirmed, whereas the 
laboratory results data reported by the NAHLN labs were not 
confirmed. The participation of SHMP was voluntary and 
provided complete information of important disease at farm 
level. This information could not be checked in the field, but 
one would expect a minimum impact of biases associated with 
the reluctance of information sharing.
Acceptability
The participation was voluntary in both SHMP and NAHLN.In 
the SHMP numerous swine producers voluntarily agreed to share 
their data from their breeding farms.The effort of NAHLN was 
unprecedented and increased from 5 laboratories in June 2013 
to 18 laboratories by May 2014. Moreover, to encourage the par-
ticipation, on June 5, 2014, with the FO, the NAHLN laboratories 
were reimbursed for SECD testing costs by the USDA, and these 
savings passed along to individual producers and companies.
The EMRS required the reporting of all cases of novel SECD to 
USDA or State animal health officials under a federally regulated 
framework.
Representativeness
In the NAHLN, 18 out of 24 diagnostic laboratories shared SECD 
testing data. All major veterinary diagnostic laboratories in the 
key swine-producing areas of the US Service participated. These 
laboratories covered 41 states plus Puerto Rico and the vast 
majority of US swine-production facilities. Over time, the num-
ber of lab accessions and reporting of NAHLN data improved. 
Although the reasons why some laboratories have not shared 
information are unclear, it is possible that they may simply not 
have had SECD cases to report or tests conducted.
In spring of 2013, the NAHLN laboratories began to voluntarily 
share the PEDV testing information in an effort to assess and under-
stand the emerging PEDV situation. In June 2013, at the request of 
the laboratories, the NAHLN of the USDA program office started 
facilitating the aggregation and reporting of PEDV testing data to 
offer national level information. From June to October 2013, only 
the positive result records were shared; after November 1, 2013, the 
labs provided both positive and negative result records.
During the spring of 2014, the NAHLN labs started to share 
PDCoV testing data in addition to PEDV testing data. In May 
2014, the NAHLN labs collectively provided over 6,000 PEDV-
PCR test records per week and the number of PEDV-positive 
laboratory accessions increased from <50/week to more than 
300. As of March 2015, the NAHLN laboratories had shared 
PEDV results from over 30,000 lab accessions, including data of 
3,880 positive accessions.
The EMRS included 1,616 premises records associated with 
the SECD situation, including 1,210 PEDV confirmed-positive 
premises and 406 PEDV presumptive-positive premises as of 
March 2015. This system was mandatory for all the country.
This SHMP database covered 752 breeding farms (including 
commercial/multiplier/nucleus) and in March 2015 this source 
represented approximately 2,110,000 sows (out of a national total 
of approximately 5.8 million). The information was supplied by 
23 production systems distributed in 16 states. The total cases 
were 467 as of March 2015 (i.e., 28.9% of cases compared to the 
1,616 SEDC cases confirmed by EMRS).
Timeliness and Stability
The USDA–NAHLN compiled the data into a standardized data-
set for analysis and distributed weekly reports summarizing the 
PEDV laboratory testing information.
The EMRS compiled the data daily and reported the extracted 
information by week. This system also provided summaries of the 
positive premises by week, month, and state. These reports were 
available to the public.
The SHMP database operated using weekly reporting updates 
with quarterly review of reports to ensure its accuracy. All the 
aggregated data were available to the public in the form of weekly 
updated charts showing the estimates of cumulative incidence, 
status prevalence, and weekly incidence trends (though raw data 
were not distributed).
The participation in both NAHLN and SHMP was voluntary, 
and thus the collaborators could terminate at any time, whereas 
the EMRS was mandatory. However, the unique program avail-
able at the beginning of the epidemic was the SHMP, followed by 
the NAHLN, and finally by the EMRS.
Outcomes evidenced that the leverage of multiple data sources 
enhanced the capacity to detect positive cases over time, and the 
EMRS provided the most reliable status of infection at herd/
premise level. It should be noted that each system uniquely had 
its own raw data, being available to the others for only review and 
discussion.
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DIsCUssIoN
The monitoring of the SECD progress in the US between May 
2013 and March 2015 supposed an important challenge due 
to the emerging nature of these viruses and the absence of a 
regulatory framework. The three monitoring systems described 
in this work allowed getting useful information for supporting 
decision-making and defining actions in government or industry 
sectors. However, important differences existed between and 
among them in terms of nature and extent of reporting, with both 
strengths and weaknesses.
An important advantage of the NAHLN database was that one 
may expect that almost every single SECD diagnosis in the US 
was included there. However, a major drawback of the NAHLN 
database was the absence of unique premises identification 
numbers (PINs), which limited the interpretation of results to 
individual samples. Although this system illustrated the explosive 
increase in samples testing positive for the disease, the NAHLN 
data could not be used to answer basic questions about the num-
ber or the location of infected premises. This limitation would be 
easily overcome by promoting the inclusion of PINs in labora-
tory sample submissions, although such implementation would 
require active education of US practitioners on the importance 
of recording such information on their submission forms (21).
The mandatory reporting of disease, which included PINs 
and other basic epidemiologic data with maintenance in the 
EMRS database, facilitated to get most accurate estimates of 
disease incidence or prevalence and geographic distribution (7). 
Unfortunately, the FO that regulated the official reporting of cases 
came too late to allow the follow-up of the disease spread and its 
scope in the critical early stages of the outbreak.
Regarding the SHMP, this system was the first to be put in 
place, and for this reason, the information collected in this 
database was critical to assess the initial stages of the epidemic, 
when most of the farms were infected. Additionally, because 
the participants voluntarily agreed to share their data, one 
would expect a minimum impact of biases associated with the 
reluctance of information sharing. However, the SHMP data 
referred only to sow farms and the information extracted are 
not representative of the situation throughout the country. The 
SHMP database demonstrated that the US swine industry had the 
potential to self-regulate the reporting of cases. But the potential 
caveat was that, being a voluntary system, the database could be 
biased and the sensitivity of reporting could vary spatially and 
temporally. However, the information routinely collected by the 
SHMP may well serve to create the foundations for an ongoing 
monitoring system database in place for monitoring emerging 
and non-reportable diseases in the US.
In conclusion, in the absence of a regulatory framework at the 
beginning of the epidemic, leveraging of multiple data sources of 
different nature and range of reporting allowed to monitor the 
spread of SEDC through the US swine herd. Results demonstrate 
the importance of collecting individual farm information in 
order to produce accurate estimates of disease spread. Experience 
gained from the case epidemic reported here may be useful to 
monitor future FAD incursions in the US.
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